India Can Lose the U.S. Market Without Losing Its Farm Exports

A country can lose an important export market without losing its overall export growth.

That may sound strange. If the United States becomes harder to sell to, especially after a sharp rise in tariffs, India’s farm exports should suffer. Yet India’s agricultural exports continued to grow in 2025-26, even as several important farm products lost sales in the American market.

This does not mean the tariffs had no effect. They did. The more interesting question is what happened next. Some Indian exporters were able to send their goods to other markets quickly enough to make up for part of the loss.

Losing access to one market does not always mean losing the ability to export. But an increase in total exports does not mean that every exporter, product or farmer has escaped the damage.

The main question is how exporters find new buyers when one market becomes harder to reach.

The apparent contradiction

India’s agricultural exports rose by 2.3% in 2025-26 to $53.1 billion, up from $52 billion in 2024-25. This was only slightly below the record of $53.2 billion reached in 2022-23.

Agricultural exports therefore grew faster than India’s total goods exports, which increased by 0.9% to $441.7 billion.

At the same time, higher US tariffs clearly damaged several Indian farm exports to America.

Marine product exports to the US fell from $2.7 billion in 2024-25 to $2.3 billion in 2025-26. Spices exports fell from $654.7 million to $578.7 million. Basmati rice exports fell from $337.1 million to $285.9 million. Processed fruits and vegetables fell from $274.3 million to $214 million.

Both things happened at the same time. India lost export value in important farm products sold to the US, while its total agricultural exports still increased.

The reason lies in what exporters did when demand from one market became weaker.

Export markets are not fixed destinations

When a product is sold in many countries, a problem in one market can push exporters to find other buyers.

They may send goods to other countries, find new customers, build stronger links with existing buyers or increase sales in markets that were smaller before.

But this change does not happen automatically.

It depends on whether other markets are available, whether buyers there want the product, whether exporters can meet their rules and standards, and whether selling there makes good business sense.

India’s marine products show how this can work.

Marine product exports increased by 13.9% to more than $8.4 billion in 2025-26, even though exports to the US fell.

Shipments to China rose from $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion. Exports to Vietnam rose from $381.8 million to $648.6 million. Exports to Japan increased from $408.5 million to $451.1 million, Belgium from $225.3 million to $376.6 million, and Thailand from $311.9 million to $362.2 million.

These increases happened while selling to America was becoming more difficult.

For marine exporters, especially those selling frozen shrimp and prawns, part of the lost US demand was matched by stronger demand in other countries.

This did more than keep the total export figure from falling. It also changed where India’s marine products were being sold.

That is diversification at its most useful. Instead of depending on one market, exporters have several markets that can help them handle a sudden change.

The strongest evidence comes from products that found other buyers

Marine products provide the clearest example, but the same pattern can be seen in other products.

Buffalo meat exports reached $5.1 billion in 2025-26, rising by 25.6%. This was higher than the previous record of $4.8 billion in 2014-15.

APEDA’s FY2025-26 figures also show buffalo meat exports at about $5.1 billion. Vietnam, Egypt, Malaysia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were among the major buyers.

The important point is not that exports increased equally in every market. They did not.

The point is that India had enough buyers in different countries for strong growth in some markets to continue even when sales in other markets were weaker.

Fresh fruits and vegetables show another example.

APEDA’s FY2025-26 figures put their exports at about $1.92 billion. Important markets included the UAE, Iraq, the Netherlands, Nepal and Malaysia.

These examples show that the US can be an important market without being the only market that can buy Indian farm products.

This difference becomes very important when trade rules suddenly make one market harder to reach.

But diversification is not the same as immunity

It would be easy to take this success too far.

If India’s farm exports increased despite US tariffs, someone might conclude that the American market no longer matters.

The figures do not support that view.

The fall in US-bound marine products, spices, basmati rice and processed fruits and vegetables shows that tariffs can still cause real losses.

Diversification also does not work equally well for every product.

Some products can be sold in different markets more easily than others. Different buyers may have different rules, tastes and needs. Transport systems and existing business relationships can also make it harder to find new customers.

A market that can buy more shrimp may not be able to buy more basmati rice or processed vegetables at the same price or in the same quantity.

Total export figures can therefore hide very different experiences.

An increase in agricultural exports from $52 billion to $53.1 billion shows that India’s overall export system remained strong.

But it does not show that every product recovered its lost US sales or that every farmer and exporter avoided losses.

The overall system can remain strong while individual exporters still face serious problems.

Diversification also depends on what creates the new demand

There is another reason not to treat every increase in exports as proof that exporters have successfully responded to US tariffs.

Coffee is a useful example.

Indian coffee exports crossed $2 billion for the first time in 2025-26. This was almost three times the $720 million recorded in 2020-21.

But this increase was linked to high global prices and very low coffee stocks around the world.

The United States Department of Agriculture expected global coffee stocks at the end of 2025-26 to be 20.1 million bags. This was the fifth year in a row that global stocks had fallen.

Brazil and Vietnam also faced weaker coffee crops.

India’s main coffee markets include Italy, Germany, Russia, the UAE and Belgium.

Having different markets can protect exports when one country creates a trade problem. But exports can also grow because of changes that have little to do with that problem.

Coffee’s growth cannot simply be seen as proof that Indian exporters deliberately replaced lost American demand.

Global supply and prices also played an important role.

If we ignore these other factors, diversification becomes an easy explanation for every increase in exports.

The hidden advantage is the ability to move between markets

The deeper lesson from India’s experience is not that it has stopped depending on the United States.

It is that some parts of India’s farm export system have built enough links with other markets to handle a shock from one major buyer.

This ability takes time to develop.

A company cannot create a new market simply by deciding to sell there.

Exporters need buyers. Their products must meet local rules. Transport and processing systems must work. Business relationships must be built.

Rules and approvals can decide whether a market is truly open to a product or only looks attractive on paper.

Having different markets and the ability to reach them therefore make exporters stronger.

If exporters already have several markets, a problem in one country becomes a challenge of moving sales elsewhere.

But if they have only one or two markets where they can sell, the same problem can lead to a much larger loss of demand.

What matters is not simply how many countries India exports to.

What matters is how many markets can actually replace one another when conditions change.

Diversification is a way to absorb shocks

Dependence is often measured by asking how much a country sells to one market.

But this alone does not show how easily exporters can adjust when conditions change.

Imagine two exporters who both receive the same share of their income from the US and face the same tariff.

One already has buyers in China, Vietnam, Japan and Europe.

The other does not.

The tariff is the same for both. But their ability to handle it is very different.

India’s marine exports show this clearly.

The US remained an important market. But the increase in shipments to other countries allowed the industry to make up for more than the loss in its American sales.

This does not make the US market unimportant.

It makes India’s export system less dependent on what happens in America.

The limits are visible too

India’s agricultural trade is not becoming safer in every way.

Farm exports have remained above $50 billion in most years since 2021-22. But agricultural imports have generally increased as well.

The agricultural trade surplus fell from $27.7 billion in 2013-14 to $12.7 billion in 2025-26.

India still exports more agricultural products than it imports. But the gap has become much smaller.

Strong export performance should not be confused with being able to produce everything India needs or being competitive in every agricultural product.

India can become better at finding buyers in other countries while also becoming more dependent on imports of some products.

The export system can therefore become more diversified across countries without becoming stronger in every part of agriculture.

This is also why the experience of marine products cannot be applied to all farm exports.

The larger transformation

The most important lesson from the US tariff shock is not that India can afford to lose the American market.

It is that losing a market and losing the ability to export are two different things.

The first is a problem with one destination.

The second is a failure of the wider export system.

India’s agricultural exporters have shown that, for some products, losing one market does not have to lead to a wider export crisis.

When demand from America became weaker, other markets also grew and took some of the pressure.

Marine products show this most clearly. Buffalo meat and fresh fruits and vegetables also show that Indian exporters have buyers in different parts of the world.

But the same figures also show the limits of this strength.

Some products sold to the US fell sharply. Not every product can be sent to another market with the same ease. Other markets may not offer the same prices or profits. And an increase in total exports does not tell us whether individual farmers and exporters suffered losses.

So India’s real protection against an external trade shock is not simply tariff negotiations.

It is the ability to keep creating real alternatives.

A diversified export economy cannot remove the cost of losing a major market. But it can change the kind of risk exporters face.

Instead of one country’s trade policy deciding the future of an entire export chain, the shock can be spread across a wider group of buyers.

That is the difference between depending on a market and being exposed to a market.

India may remain exposed to the United States. But where exporters have built enough alternatives, they no longer have to be defined by what happens there.