The Federal Balance Is Shaped by Political Parties as Much as by Constitutional Rules

India’s Constitution divides governmental authority between the Union and the States. But the constitutional distribution of powers does not operate in a political vacuum.

The institutions created by the Constitution are occupied by political actors, and those actors belong to organisations with their own hierarchies, electoral interests and strategies. A Chief Minister therefore operates simultaneously as the head of a State government and as a political leader. A legislator exercises constitutional authority while also functioning within a party organisation. Governments that are formally separate can consequently be connected by political relationships that the constitutional text does not describe.

This creates an important distinction.

The Constitution determines the formal location of power. Political organisation influences the way that power is exercised.

That helps explain why Centre-State relations can change substantially even when the constitutional allocation of powers remains broadly unchanged.

Federalism operates through political organisations as well as constitutional institutions

The conventional understanding of Indian federalism begins with the Union and the States.

But the political system adds another layer.

A national party may control the Union government while also governing several States. A regional party may govern a State while simultaneously participating in national coalitions and influencing decisions at the Union level. Political organisations can therefore connect institutions that the constitutional structure treats as distinct.

The constitutional boundaries remain intact.

The political relationships operating across those boundaries do not.

This distinction matters because the same constitutional power can have different practical consequences depending on the political environment surrounding it.

A Chief Minister negotiating with the Union may be acting primarily on behalf of the State government. But the Chief Minister may also be responding to party leadership, coalition calculations or electoral considerations extending beyond the State.

The political incentives surrounding a constitutional power therefore matter alongside the power itself.

This does not make political parties inherently centralising or decentralising forces.

National parties can create political links across regions and provide mechanisms for national integration. Regional parties can bring State-specific interests into national decision-making. Coalition governments can give State-based political actors greater leverage at the Union level.

The consequence is more complicated than a simple Centre-versus-State model.

Federal outcomes are partly shaped by the political organisations through which constitutional authority is exercised.

The Chief Minister operates in two institutional worlds

The position of a Chief Minister illustrates this particularly clearly.

Constitutionally, the Chief Minister heads the State executive.

Politically, the Chief Minister is also a party leader.

These roles normally work together. But they do not necessarily generate identical incentives.

Suppose the party governing a State also controls the Union government. The two governments may share policy priorities, political leadership and electoral interests. Coordination may consequently become easier because disagreements can be managed within a common political organisation.

Yet the same arrangement can create incentives for State-level priorities to be considered alongside objectives established at a broader political level.

Now reverse the situation.

If a State government is controlled by a party competing against the party governing at the Union level, the constitutional responsibilities of the two governments remain exactly the same. But the political incentives surrounding their interaction change.

Disagreements can acquire an electoral dimension.

The practical exercise of federal authority can therefore vary even when the formal constitutional authority does not.

That is why asking only “Which government has the power?” does not completely explain how Indian federalism functions.

The next question is:

What political incentives surround the exercise of that power?

Party discipline also operates inside State legislatures

The influence of political parties becomes even clearer inside legislatures.

Indian legislators are not independent constitutional actors in the same way that a purely individualised parliamentary model might suggest. Party affiliation structures much of legislative behaviour.

The Tenth Schedule formalised an important part of this relationship by providing for disqualification on specified grounds of defection, including voting or abstaining contrary to party directions in circumstances covered by the law.

The result is that party organisation has a formal consequence for legislative functioning.

A State legislature remains constitutionally distinct from Parliament. But the political organisation represented inside the State legislature may also exist at the Union level.

This creates channels of influence that run across constitutional institutions.

The constitutional structure remains vertical:

Union ↕ State

Political organisation adds another set of relationships:

Party leadership ↕ Legislators ↕ Governments

These two structures can overlap.

When they do, political incentives can affect how constitutional powers are negotiated and exercised.

This does not eliminate the federal division of authority. It means that the practical operation of that division cannot be understood entirely from constitutional provisions.

Coalition governments alter the bargaining environment

The importance of political parties becomes particularly visible when the Union government depends on regional parties for parliamentary support.

The coalition experience of the 1990s and 2000s demonstrated how national governments could become dependent on parties whose political bases were concentrated in particular States. This created greater opportunities for negotiation between national and regional political actors.

But coalition government should not automatically be equated with stronger federalism.

A regional party entering a national coalition has its own political objectives. It may use its position to obtain resources, policy concessions or advantages for its State. At the same time, maintaining its own political position within the State may be more important than challenging the broader structure of national power.

The present political configuration illustrates the same complexity from another direction. Regional parties participating in a national coalition may have considerable bargaining capacity, but they also have State-level electoral calculations.

The important relationship is therefore not simply:

Coalition = stronger federalism

A more accurate formulation is:

Coalition government changes dependence → dependence changes bargaining → bargaining creates opportunities for federal negotiation.

What ultimately emerges depends on how political actors use those opportunities.

This distinction is important because federalism is not produced automatically by any particular party configuration.

Party alignment can change Centre-State interaction

The political value of having the same party govern the Union and a State illustrates another mechanism.

When the same political organisation controls both levels, administrative coordination may become easier. Policy priorities can be aligned, communication channels may be stronger, and disagreements may be handled through internal political mechanisms rather than public confrontation.

But coordination and constitutional autonomy are not identical things.

The political argument sometimes associated with a “double-engine” government illustrates this distinction. The claim is essentially that political alignment can make it easier for governments at two levels to work together.

That proposition concerns coordination.

It does not, by itself, establish whether alignment produces better economic outcomes or greater State autonomy.

The more important constitutional question is different:

Does political alignment alter how citizens perceive the relationship between constitutional entitlements and party control?

If public expectations begin to associate access to development, resources or policy benefits with electing the same party at different levels, party competition becomes relevant to the way federalism itself is understood.

The constitutional framework has not changed.

The political meaning surrounding that framework may have.

Federalism also involves relationships among States

The Union-State relationship is only one dimension of Indian federalism.

States also interact with one another.

This is particularly visible in areas such as taxation, water, environmental management, resource distribution and political representation, where the interests of several States may overlap.

The GST Council provides a constitutional example of collective Union-State decision-making. Article 279A establishes a Council in which the Union and States participate in decisions relating to the GST system.

The significance of such arrangements extends beyond taxation.

They demonstrate that federal decision-making does not always have to take the form of one State negotiating separately with the Union.

States can also develop common positions.

That possibility becomes important in areas where several States face similar concerns. Collective action can allow States to negotiate from a shared position rather than relying exclusively on bilateral relationships with the Union.

But political competition can make such cooperation difficult.

Two States may have similar economic interests while being governed by competing parties. A position that appears advantageous to a State institutionally may become politically complicated if it also benefits a rival party.

This is where the boundary between constitutional disagreement and political competition becomes difficult to identify.

A dispute between governments can be about constitutional authority.

It can also be about competing political interests.

Often, the two operate simultaneously.

Political parties can integrate as well as centralise

It would be misleading to treat party politics only as a threat to federalism.

National parties perform an important integrative function. They create political organisations capable of operating across linguistic, regional and State boundaries. They allow national political questions to be organised within a common political framework.

Regional parties perform a different function. They make State-specific political interests significant at the national level and can force national governments to account for regional concerns.

These functions can pull in different directions.

A national party structure can make coordination easier across levels of government.

The same structure can also concentrate political decision-making.

Regional parties can strengthen the visibility of State interests.

Coalition dependence can give those parties additional bargaining leverage.

None of these relationships is automatic.

The federal balance emerges from their interaction.

Political boundaries do not always coincide with constitutional boundaries

The deeper consequence is that political parties can change the practical relationship between the Union and the States without altering the constitutional text.

When one party governs at both levels, the governments remain constitutionally separate. But political communication and decision-making may be linked through the same organisation.

When different parties control the two governments, those constitutional boundaries remain exactly where they were, but political negotiation may become more adversarial.

This produces an important distinction between the formal and practical dimensions of federalism.

Formal federalism asks:

Which institution has legal authority?

Practical federalism asks:

What determines whether that authority can be exercised effectively?

The answer to the second question includes factors that constitutional schedules cannot capture by themselves: party organisation, electoral incentives, fiscal capacity, administrative capability, political support and the bargaining position of different governments.

The constitutional division of powers is therefore necessary to understand federalism.

It is not sufficient.

Party dominance is only one variable

This also explains why arguments about party dominance and federalism can become too simplistic.

It is tempting to assume that stronger national-party dominance must weaken States.

It is equally tempting to assume that coalition governments must strengthen them.

Neither proposition works as a general rule.

The experience of coalition politics demonstrates why. Regional parties can gain bargaining power when a national government depends on them. But the use of that bargaining power depends on their own political interests.

Similarly, a State government aligned with the Union may find coordination easier. A State government controlled by a competing party may have greater incentives to emphasise institutional autonomy.

But party configuration is only one part of the equation.

A State’s bargaining position can also depend on its economic weight, fiscal capacity, administrative capability, electoral importance and relationships with other States.

Fiscal federalism provides a clear illustration.

The distribution of resources between the Union and States is structured through constitutional institutions such as the Finance Commission. For the 2026–31 award period, the Sixteenth Finance Commission recommended retaining the States’ share in the divisible pool at 41 percent.

Party politics can influence the political bargaining surrounding these institutions.

It does not replace the institutions themselves.

The federal balance therefore cannot be understood simply by looking at which party controls which government.

The more useful question is how political organisation interacts with constitutional authority.

The federal balance has a formal and political dimension

India’s Constitution provides the formal structure through which Union-State relations operate.

Political parties form part of the political environment within which that structure functions.

They influence how governments negotiate with one another. They shape the incentives of legislators and Chief Ministers. They determine when regional interests become national bargaining positions. They can facilitate coordination between levels of government, but they can also turn institutional disputes into extensions of electoral competition.

This helps explain why the same constitutional arrangement can operate differently under different political conditions.

Coalition governments can increase the importance of regional parties.

Strong national-party control can reduce dependence on those parties.

Shared party control can make coordination easier.

Competing party control can increase political incentives for institutional differentiation.

But none of these configurations produces a predetermined federal outcome.

The effect depends on how political actors use the institutional space available to them.

The Constitution establishes the framework. Political organisation shapes its operation.

The most useful way to understand Indian federalism is therefore to look beyond the formal distribution of powers.

Political parties are not external observers of federalism.

They occupy the legislatures.

They form governments.

They select political leadership.

They organise electoral competition.

They negotiate coalitions.

They connect political actors across State and Union institutions.

As a result, they influence the conditions under which constitutional authority is exercised.

The Constitution establishes the formal relationship between the Union and the States.

Political organisation influences the bargaining that takes place within that relationship.

This does not mean that party politics overrides constitutional rules. Nor does it mean that constitutional institutions are merely instruments of political parties.

It means that federalism operates through both.

The formal structure determines the legal boundaries.

The political structure affects the incentives, negotiations and conflicts that occur within those boundaries.

That is why India’s federal balance cannot be understood only through the question of who possesses constitutional power.

It also requires asking:

What political relationships determine how that power is exercised?

The answer lies at the intersection of constitutional authority, party organisation, institutional capacity and political bargaining.