The Feed Market India Is Building—and Why Washington Wants Into It

India’s agricultural trade talks with the United States are often discussed in terms of the foods people eat: dairy, cereals, edible oils, fruits and meat.

But one of the more important markets being discussed is not found on the dinner table. It is the market that feeds animals.

As Indian households consume more milk, eggs, meat and fish, demand for poultry, dairy and fish farming grows. These industries, in turn, need large amounts of maize, oilseed meals, bran and other feed ingredients. This creates a market that can grow even when India’s direct food imports remain politically sensitive.

This is where the American opportunity begins.

A March 2025 report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture projected that India’s domestic maize consumption could rise from an estimated 34.7 million tonnes in 2022–23 to 62.8 million tonnes by 2040 and 93 million tonnes by 2050 under a moderate-growth scenario. Under a faster-growth scenario, the projections rise to 98 million tonnes in 2040 and 200.2 million tonnes in 2050. Soyabean-meal consumption could also rise from 6.2 million tonnes to 17.7 million tonnes by 2040 under the moderate scenario.

These figures do not show how much India will import from America. They point to a more important change: the feed market can grow faster than the political space available for opening India’s food market.

The demand is changing before the trade does

Feed demand is ultimately linked to what people eat. Maize, wheat, rice, sorghum and other cereals provide energy to poultry, livestock and fish farming. Protein comes from soyabean meal and meals made from other oilseeds, along with bran and other ingredients. For example, maize usually makes up 55–65% of broiler feed by weight.

As diets shift towards more protein-rich foods, demand for animal feed also grows. More eggs require more poultry feed; more chicken requires more feed; more milk requires more cattle feed; and more farmed fish requires more fish feed.

India already has a large feed industry. Total production of compound feed is estimated at around 60 million tonnes: roughly 40 million tonnes of poultry feed, 18 million tonnes of cattle feed and 2 million tonnes of fish and shrimp feed. At current prices at the factory level, the industry has been estimated to be worth more than ₹1.75 lakh crore.

Its importance comes not only from its size, but also from the regular demand it creates for commodities traded across countries. The question is whether domestic production can provide the agricultural inputs needed by a much larger animal-protein economy.

India has a feed problem before it has an import policy

Most feed ingredients are currently supplied within India, but crop productivity varies greatly.

In 2024–25, maize yields averaged about 3.75 tonnes per hectare in India, compared with 11.25 tonnes in the United States. Soyabean yields were below one tonne per hectare in India, against 3.4 tonnes in the United States.

These differences do not automatically mean India must import American maize or soyabean. Yield is only one part of the picture. Farmers respond to prices, crop choices, water availability, technology, domestic demand and government policy. India can also increase production, improve productivity or use other feed ingredients.

The pressure begins when the demand for animal products grows faster than the production of feed crops. India could respond by increasing domestic production, using other ingredients or importing more.

The USDA’s scenarios show how large this change could be. Under the moderate-growth scenario, India’s maize imports could reach 11 million tonnes in 2040 and 26 million tonnes in 2050. Under the rapid-growth scenario, the figures rise to 46 million tonnes and 134 million tonnes. Soyabean-meal imports could also increase greatly under both scenarios.

These are possible outcomes, not fixed results. But they show why feed has become strategically important: a growing animal-protein economy can create demand for imports even when India remains reluctant to open its market to politically sensitive food products.

India has already shown that feed shortages can lead to temporary changes in import policy. During a soybean shortage in 2021, the government allowed a one-time import of about 1.2 million tonnes of soybean meal and soy cake, according to USDA analysis. Domestic soybean prices later fell.

This does not prove that India will follow the same policy permanently. But it shows that shortages of feed can change the practical limits of its import policy.

Why American agriculture fits this market

The United States is not just another possible supplier. Its agricultural system produces very large amounts of the commodities used in industrial animal feed.

India’s yearly maize and soyabean production, at around 43 million tonnes and 12.5 million tonnes, is much smaller than U.S. production, which is cited at around 425 million tonnes for maize and 120 million tonnes for soyabean. For American agriculture, finding more export markets for these commodities is commercially important.

Yet the most obvious American products are also those India has been reluctant to allow in. Much of the maize and soyabean grown in the United States is genetically modified (GM). India has not opened its market to American GM maize and soyabean in a way that would allow unrestricted imports.

The opportunity, therefore, is not simply to negotiate lower tariffs on every agricultural product. It is to find ways into the parts of India’s market where demand is growing and American products can fit within existing limits.

Two products show how this can happen.

Sorghum is the first opening

The first is red sorghum.

The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of sorghum. Its estimated production and exports were 11 million tonnes and 5.4 million tonnes respectively in 2025–26. The U.S. Grains Council has actively promoted American sorghum in India as a non-GM alternative to GM corn.

Sorghum therefore offers more than another crop. It provides a possible way into a growing feed market without immediately raising the most politically difficult question: whether India will allow large imports of GM maize.

The February 2026 India–U.S. joint statement is important here. It specifically includes red sorghum among the U.S. agricultural products for which India agreed to remove or reduce tariffs under the framework for an interim trade agreement.

Trade liberalisation does not always begin with the product that offers the biggest commercial opportunity. It can begin with a product that fits the political and regulatory limits of the country receiving it.

Sorghum gives Indian feed manufacturers another source of grain while giving American exporters access to a market that remains closed to their most obvious product.

DDGS is an even more revealing compromise

The second opening is distiller’s dried grains with solubles, or DDGS.

DDGS is a by-product of ethanol production. Maize contains roughly 70% starch, along with protein and oil. During ethanol production, the starch is changed into ethanol, which is then separated. The material that remains is dried to make DDGS. This process produces a feed ingredient with much more protein than the original grain.

For India, DDGS is especially interesting because it is not simply another grain competing with maize. It is a feed ingredient made as part of another industrial process.

India already has its own DDGS industry. Grain-based ethanol distilleries were supplying more than 3 million tonnes to the feed industry, with production expected to reach 4.2 million tonnes in 2025–26. Imports from the United States can add to this supply even though American DDGS is made from GM corn.

The February 2026 India–U.S. joint statement specifically lists dried distillers’ grains among the U.S. agricultural products covered by India’s planned tariff reductions.

This creates an unusual kind of market opening. India can keep restrictions on direct imports of American GM maize and soyabean while allowing a product made from GM maize to enter the country.

Trade policy is therefore not always a simple choice between opening and closing a market. A country can restrict one product while allowing selected inputs, alternatives or processed products. Sorghum and DDGS show how this kind of selective access can develop.

The hidden constraint is not just GM technology

Another pressure is emerging within the feed market: maize itself is gaining another use.

India is increasingly using maize as a raw material for ethanol. The maize crop is expected to supply around 10–12 million tonnes for ethanol production out of an overall production estimate of 50 million tonnes in the relevant season. India also imported around one million tonnes of maize in 2024–25, almost eight times the previous year’s level.

The same crop must therefore serve food, feed and fuel.

If ethanol production uses more maize, the feed industry has to compete for the same raw material. If demand for animal protein rises at the same time, the need for feed also increases.

Imports are not the only possible response. India can increase maize production, use other grains, improve yields or change the costs and benefits of ethanol and feed production. But the different uses of maize make the feed market more important.

The central question is whether India’s agricultural system can meet the needs of several growing industries at the same time.

Why the American opportunity is larger than a tariff concession

Seen narrowly, access for American sorghum and DDGS may look like a small trade concession. But when we look at the feed system, it reveals a much larger opportunity.

As India’s animal-protein economy grows, demand for feed also rises. This increases the need for maize, protein meals and other ingredients. Domestic supply may not always grow at the same speed. Ethanol creates another demand for maize, while some of the most productive foreign suppliers face restrictions because their main crops are genetically modified.

This creates a market in which commercial opportunities can grow before full agricultural liberalisation becomes politically possible.

The difference between American corn, American soyabean, American sorghum and American DDGS is therefore important. India does not treat them all in the same way.

Corn and soyabean offer large direct opportunities but face the strongest restrictions related to GM crops. Sorghum can meet part of the feed demand without crossing the same regulatory limit.

DDGS goes further. It allows a feed ingredient made from GM corn to enter even while direct imports of GM corn remain restricted.

The result is selective integration rather than complete opening or complete protection.

The market India is building may matter more than the market it is opening

Agricultural trade is often discussed as a contest over finished products: whose apples, dairy products, cereals or meat will enter whose market.

Feed changes this picture because it sits underneath the animal-protein economy.

Greater demand for eggs creates demand for feed. A larger poultry industry creates demand for maize and protein. A larger fish-farming industry creates another feed market. A larger dairy economy adds another layer of demand.

The market grows through the production system, not only at the retail shelf.

This gives the United States a reason to negotiate access even if India continues to protect some of its most sensitive agricultural products.

It also gives India a reason to move carefully. Imported feed can reduce costs for a growing livestock and poultry sector, while exposing domestic crop producers to more competition. Allowing more imports of one ingredient can also change the costs of another.

The trade-off is between different parts of India’s own agricultural economy. Greater access may benefit feed users without producing the same result for farmers who grow domestic alternatives.

The real significance of the feed market

The most important change may be happening before the imports arrive.

India’s changing diet is turning feed from a background agricultural input into an important part of trade policy. The question is whether a rapidly growing animal-protein economy will eventually need a larger international supply chain for the inputs that support it.

The outcome is not fixed. USDA projections are possible scenarios, not guarantees. India can improve yields, expand domestic farming, use other feed ingredients or change the balance between food, feed and fuel. Nor does rising feed demand mean that future imports will necessarily come from the United States.

But the pressure is clear.

India’s agricultural trade frontier is moving upstream.

The most important opening may not be the arrival of an American food product on an Indian supermarket shelf. It may be the gradual use of American agricultural commodities and by-products in the production system that supplies India’s future demand for milk, eggs, meat and fish.

Washington is therefore not simply trying to sell India more grain. It is trying to gain a place in a market India is still building.