When the U.S. Retreats, Who Supplies Global Public Goods?

What happens when a country that has helped fund and support international institutions decides that many of these institutions no longer serve its interests?

The immediate concern is money. But the deeper question is whether other countries can maintain the cooperation that this funding and participation helped support.

Global public goods rarely disappear as soon as their funding is withdrawn. Climate cooperation, development finance, technical assistance, and international coordination depend on institutions that work across countries and over long periods. When a major power steps back, the consequences depend not only on the resources lost but also on whether other countries can keep these institutions working.

The question, therefore, is not simply who will replace the United States. It is which countries can provide the resources, coordination, and institutional support needed to address particular global problems.

Global public goods depend on more than money

A global public good is something whose benefits extend beyond the country paying for it. Climate stability is one example. A country that helps finance solar power projects in another country does not receive all the benefits of that investment. The same applies to technical expertise, development finance, ways of sharing financial risks, and institutions that make cooperation between countries easier.

This creates a problem. Individual countries have reasons to benefit from international cooperation while limiting how much they contribute themselves. International institutions help address this problem by pooling resources, setting common rules, reducing the costs of working together, and giving countries a place to coordinate actions that would be difficult to organise separately.

A major power’s role in these institutions therefore goes beyond its financial contribution. Its participation can strengthen confidence in an institution, while its withdrawal can make other countries less certain about the institution’s future.

The International Solar Alliance provides a useful example.

Established in 2015, the ISA aims to make solar power cheaper and easier to adopt, particularly in developing countries. It does not build solar power plants itself. Instead, it helps countries access finance, reduce investment risks, and expand solar power more quickly. The Alliance has more than 120 member countries and works across Africa, Asia, and island nations.

The United States joined in 2021 and contributed about $2.1 million over three years, representing roughly 1% of the Alliance’s total funds. In January 2026, a White House executive action on U.S. participation in international organisations listed the ISA among the organisations targeted for withdrawal. The announcement shows the administration’s policy direction, but it does not, by itself, establish the full withdrawal timeline or the resulting financial impact on the Alliance.

This example highlights an important distinction: an institution can survive the withdrawal of a major participant, but its survival does not automatically mean it can continue performing every function as effectively as before.

The countries most exposed are not necessarily the ones making the most noise

For India, the immediate consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the ISA are limited. Its solar industry is increasingly supported by domestic demand. Projects are backed by long-term contracts with state utilities and central agencies, while Indian banks, global funds, and development institutions continue to finance them.

India’s solar manufacturing capacity has also expanded rapidly. By late 2025, module manufacturing capacity was close to 144 GW and cell manufacturing capacity was around 25 GW. These capabilities give India a degree of protection that many poorer countries do not have.

A country with a large domestic market, established financial institutions, and growing manufacturing capacity can manage the withdrawal of one external partner more easily. A poorer developing country trying to build its first large solar project may depend much more on affordable finance, international cooperation, and arrangements that reduce investment risks.

The ISA works extensively in Africa and other poorer developing countries. When a major economy reduces its involvement in climate action, lenders may become more cautious, projects may take longer to move forward, and securing finance may become harder. The bigger risk is not simply losing one contributor, but whether the wider system remains willing to take on financial risks.

This is where the effects of U.S. withdrawal become unequal. India may have enough domestic capacity to continue expanding its solar sector, while other countries may struggle to finance projects that depend on international support.

India’s capacity to act does not eliminate its wider responsibilities

India’s solar sector still depends on a global system. China remains the dominant producer of high-efficiency mass-market solar modules and cells, accounting for about 70% of global cell-producing capacity. India imported roughly $1.7 billion worth of photovoltaic modules from China in FY25.

India therefore faces two different questions. First, can it continue its own transition to solar energy despite changes in American participation? Second, can it help other developing countries access the finance, institutions, and cooperation needed to make their own transitions?

The ISA matters to India partly because it provides a way to work with developing countries on a shared problem. Through such institutions, India can help shape international climate cooperation while strengthening its role in the Global South.

But being able to participate in international cooperation is not the same as being able to finance it on a large scale. India’s domestic strength gives it a foundation for action, but it does not give India the resources to take over every responsibility previously supported by the United States.

Cooperation can continue through different institutional arrangements

Large international institutions have one major advantage: legitimacy. They bring together countries that might not otherwise work together through smaller groups, establish common standards, represent a wide range of countries, and provide a framework for international cooperation. Their weakness is that reaching agreement among so many countries can be slow.

Smaller groups of countries can be more flexible. Countries with a shared interest can work together without waiting for everyone to agree. India has increasingly used this kind of approach in its foreign policy.

This can be seen in initiatives such as the ISA, BRICS, and the Quad, although their purposes and memberships are very different. BRICS is a broader political and economic grouping in which demands for a stronger voice for developing countries and greater influence over development finance have become increasingly important. As chair and host in 2026, India has an opportunity to push the group towards more practical cooperation, including better use of the New Development Bank’s financing tools.

The Quad is a different arrangement, bringing together four countries rather than a broad coalition of developing countries.

Neither arrangement can simply replace the United Nations or the wider international system. They serve different purposes. Institutions that include almost every country provide broad representation and legitimacy, while smaller groups can sometimes coordinate more quickly or focus resources on a particular problem.

The practical question is how these arrangements can support one another. A smaller group may help move a particular initiative forward, but it cannot automatically provide the same broad representation as a universal institution. Similarly, an international institution may enjoy wide acceptance but still struggle to raise resources or reach agreements quickly.

When providing global public goods, the goal should not be to find a single replacement for American leadership. It should be to identify which institutions and groups of countries can continue performing each essential function.

The role of middle powers is to make cooperation possible

For India, this creates an opportunity to contribute to international cooperation without assuming that it can replace the United States.

The ISA provides a realistic example. India does not need to finance the world’s entire transition to solar energy. It can help build institutions through which countries coordinate their efforts, access finance, reduce risks, and develop their capabilities. A country can gain international influence by making cooperation possible rather than depending entirely on one major power.

The same reasoning helps explain India’s interest in BRICS and other groups. Their value does not lie in creating a completely different world order overnight. Instead, they provide additional ways for developing countries to coordinate their interests and work together on practical issues.

However, bringing countries together and keeping an institution running are two different tasks. Filling a gap in international cooperation requires money, expertise, broad acceptance, and sustained political commitment. No single middle power currently has all these resources on the scale needed to replace the United States.

India’s contribution is therefore more likely to focus on specific areas than to cover every responsibility. It can support cooperation where it has expertise, political credibility, or a direct interest, while working with other countries to share the burden.

This approach also requires realistic expectations. Additional groups may improve cooperation in particular areas, but they can also create overlapping initiatives, competing standards, and different levels of commitment. Having more institutions does not automatically make international cooperation more effective.

Funding uncertainty has consequences beyond climate cooperation

The change in U.S. policy can be seen beyond climate action. In January 2025, a White House executive order on withdrawal from the World Health Organization set out the administration’s intention to leave the organisation. A February 2025 order directed a review of U.S. participation and funding across certain United Nations bodies and other international organisations.

These actions show a change in policy direction. They should not be treated as proof that every proposed withdrawal or funding change was immediately completed.

The financial effects also depend on the institution involved. In its April 2025 programme-budget briefing, the World Health Organization described financial pressures for the 2026–27 period. These included a projected gap in funding for salaries associated with unpaid U.S. assessed contributions for 2024 and 2025, as well as reductions in assistance from other countries. The WHO’s account shows how uncertainty over funding can affect institutional planning. It also makes clear that the pressures it described were not caused by the United States alone.

The consequences depend on how each institution receives its funding, which commitments remain in place, and whether other members can make up for any shortfall. An announced withdrawal, a funding decision, and the eventual effects on an institution’s work are three different stages.

For institutions responsible for global public goods, the challenge is to keep essential functions running while adapting to changes in participation and funding. This requires identifying where funding gaps matter most, which activities can continue through other arrangements, and where countries still need to act together.

India cannot replace American capacity. It can help replace missing coordination.

India’s domestic solar sector shows that the country is less dependent on American participation than it might once have been. Domestic demand, financial institutions, and manufacturing capacity provide important protection. But the ISA also shows that being able to withstand external changes at home and taking responsibility for international cooperation are two different things.

India can protect its own interests while poorer developing countries continue to struggle to access the institutions and affordable finance needed to invest in climate action. The consequences would not remain limited to those countries. Climate cooperation is interconnected: delays in expanding clean energy in one part of the world affect the wider effort to reduce emissions.

The most important consequence of U.S. withdrawal may therefore be a change in how international responsibilities are shared. Instead of relying on one major power to provide a large share of the resources and political support, countries may need to sustain cooperation through existing institutions, smaller groups, and contributions from a wider range of countries.

India is well placed to take part in this transition, but taking part is not the same as replacing the United States.

The future of global public goods will depend on whether enough countries can build institutions, partnerships, and funding arrangements that keep cooperation working when the largest contributors become less willing to lead. The central challenge is not simply to find another country to take America’s place. It is to ensure that the essential work of international cooperation continues.